

## Russia, Dugin, and Traditionalism in Politics: Political and Theological Placement of The Fourth Political Theory

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*Men of action cut a large figure in the history books, but it is the ideas placed in their heads by men of thought that actually determine what they do.*

- Robert Zubrin

### Abstract

Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin, the contemporary Russian political philosopher and sociologist, postulates that the world has experienced three major political theories since the Enlightenment: the first, Liberalism; the second, Communism; and the third, Fascism. These three theories competed for supremacy, and although archaic vestiges of both Fascism and Communism still have advocates (and even some remaining nation-state adherents), Liberalism emerged as the clear victor. With the fall of the Fascist/National Socialist states - Italy followed by Germany at the conclusion of World War II - and the subsequent complete collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991, Liberalism was left as the only serious political theory actor standing on the world stage. Despite the apparent victory, Dugin and others do not believe that Liberalism's success is either permanent or desirable. Hence an alternative political theory to challenge Liberalism is being hailed; an additional paladin has entered the lists to tilt the apparent champion. The new challenger is recognized as an opponent in sequence: a fourth theory. This Fourth Theory has strong Traditional religious strands. Proper placement of the Fourth Political theory must consider the religious as well as the political aspects of Dugin's concept.

### Introduction

To claim that Aleksandr Dugin is merely a controversial figure is to engage in serious understatement.<sup>1</sup> He is acclaimed as a significant influence on Vladimir Putin and simultaneously reportedly to be out of favor in Moscow. He was listed as Head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University, then reportedly dismissed from the faculty in mid-2014 only to have conflicting reports from the University and others regarding his actual employment status.<sup>2</sup> Andreas Umland, Russian/Ukrainian specialist and Dugin critic, does not hesitate to pin the label "obscurantist pseudo-scholar" onto Dugin, and claims that Dugin "uses 'conservatism' as a cover for the spread of a revolutionary ultranationalist and neo-imperialist ideology."<sup>3</sup> Translator and researcher, Yigal Liverant, on the other hand, describes Dugin as a "gifted and charismatic intellectual," and claims, "there is an undeniable connection between Dugin's politics and the regime change led by [Vladimir] Putin."<sup>4</sup> Dugin seems to simultaneously exist in an ethereal world of present power and official disfavor. However, it is Dugin's political

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<sup>1</sup> Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin (Александр Гельевич Дугин) hereafter Aleksandr Dugin, or Dugin, unless his name is included in quoted material and given a different spelling.

<sup>2</sup> See for example: Comments of Catherine Fitzpatrick, "Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University? (23-29 June)," *THEINTERPRETER*, <http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-what-will-be-twitthers-fate-in-russia/>. See also: Dugin's CV posted on his website <http://dugin.ru/biografia.html>. Excerpt: 2009 - 2014 Head. Department of Sociology of International Relations Sociology Faculty of Moscow State University. *MV Lomonosov Moscow State University*. [Italics added].

<sup>3</sup> Andreas Umland, "Fascist Tendencies in Russian Higher Education: The Rise of Aleksandr Dugin and the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University," *Demokratizatsiya*, Spring (2011), [https://www.academia.edu/854121/Fascist\\_Tendencies\\_in\\_Russian\\_Higher\\_Education\\_The\\_Rise\\_of\\_Aleksandr\\_Dugin\\_and\\_the\\_Faculty\\_of\\_Sociology\\_of\\_Moscow\\_State\\_University](https://www.academia.edu/854121/Fascist_Tendencies_in_Russian_Higher_Education_The_Rise_of_Aleksandr_Dugin_and_the_Faculty_of_Sociology_of_Moscow_State_University).

<sup>4</sup> Yigal Liverant, "The Prophet of the New Russian Empire," *Azure* 35, Winter (2009), <http://azure.org.il/article.php?id=483>.

philosophy, its sticking power, and the reception it is afforded (especially in the West), not his academic position nor his official titles, that make up the critical pertinence concerned in this brief study.

Dugin portrays Liberalism as a deadly and godless trap with only “one way out.”<sup>5</sup> That way is “to reject the classical political theories, both winners and losers, strain our imaginations, seize the reality of a new world, correctly decipher the challenges of postmodernity, and create something new - something beyond the political battles of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.”<sup>6</sup> The challenges of Postmodernity that Dugin wants to decipher include the challenge of Liberalism itself. Dugin believes the challenge of Liberalism can be defeated with a new approach. The approach to “create something new” is “an invitation to the development of the Fourth Political Theory;” something that is “beyond Communism, fascism and liberalism,” and it will define a multipolar world instead of a world of Western hegemony.<sup>7</sup>

The Oxford Roundtable of July 29 - August 1, 2015 focused on the themes of Religion, Women, and History. This article addresses the placement of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory within these three overlapping realms. Remarkable of the Fourth Political Theory is its emphasis on the inclusiveness of religion, not the rejection, exclusion, or ambivalence accorded to it by the first three theories. The role of women as viable political actors, while not specifically rejected, must be viewed in Fourth Political Theory perspectives by considering the historical overtones of Traditionalism that Dugin combines with Russian Orthodoxy and the corresponding resonance to patriarchal and anti-modern elements of Islam included in his Eurasianist outlook. The implications for future traction of Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory become more predictable with better understanding of its relationships to Religion, Women, and History.

### **Invitation to the Fourth Political Theory**

To put Dugin’s nascent political philosophy in advocate terms, it favors a multipolar global political landscape upon which the First Political Theory, Liberalism, is curtailed; defeated some would say, and supplanted by the Fourth Political Theory. This Fourth Political Theory has been sketched out, but Dugin admits it lacks the detail or experiential elements needed to fully compare its viability to its long extant rival, Liberalism. Dugin characterizes his introduction to this fourth way as an “invitation” to participate in the full development of a new political paradigm.<sup>8</sup> To whom this “invitation” is specifically directed is not completely clear, but it seems to have gained traction with the Russian New Right (RNR) and the *Nouvelle Droite*, the European New Right (ENR). What can be readily ascertained is that the Fourth Political Theory advocates a world ideologically opposed to many facets of Western European and U.S. liberal democracy. This Fourth Political Theory displays decidedly anti-modern characteristics, and this anti-modernism may be construed as anti-Westernism - especially Westernism U.S. style.

Dugin’s book, *The Fourth Political Theory*, is a culmination of his political thought regarding the trajectory of Russia’s political future and the demise of Western political power in the world arena. Dugin is unwilling to allow Liberalism to be left standing alone on the political field, unwilling to accept that the defeat of Communism and Fascism has left Liberalism as the *de facto* last word in historical political development. His refusal to concede Liberalism the victory defines Dugin as its vehement opponent.

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<sup>5</sup>Aleksandr Dugin, *The Fourth Political Theory* (London: Arktos, 2012), 12. In a note from the editor the following is written, “The bulk of the text in this book was published as *Chetvertaia politicheskaja teoriia*, which was published in St. Petersburg in 2009 by Amphora. The text has been revised by the author, and additional chapters have been added to it.”

<sup>6</sup> Dugin, “Fourth Political Theory,”12.

<sup>7</sup> Dugin, “Fourth Political Theory,”12.

<sup>8</sup> Dugin, “Fourth Political Theory,”35.

Dugin describes his formulation of the Fourth Political Theory as a process that extended over several years. During this process, Dugin eventually rejected the idea that Communism and Fascism had salvageable elements that could be used to form a synthesis that eliminated both the abhorrent manifestations of Soviet praxis and the unspeakable aberrance of Nazi National Socialist deviance.

From 20008 [sic] when the main principles of the 4PT [Fourth Political Theory] were clearly formulated I have renounced to any appeal to the second or third political theories (communism and nationalism) and I has [sic] concentrated exclusively on the elaboration of fully independent Fourth Political Theory breaking any ties with the [sic] Modernity.<sup>9</sup>

Dugin's invitation is to join with him in both placing flesh on the bones of the Fourth Political Theory. But, Dugin has a much more practical and existential invitation to extend as well: an invitation to participate in the rise of the Russian State as the Eurasianist counterbalance to the hegemony of the Global West.

### **Religious Aspects of The Fourth Political Theory**

Dugin juxtaposes the Fourth Political Theory in diametric opposition to Western Liberalism. His enthusiastic inclusion of religion as an integral element of the state evidences a clear demarcation of Traditional versus Modern worldviews. In the Fourth Political Theory Dugin articulates a viewpoint very similar to the one so clearly stated by Max Weber's observation (paraphrased by Carl Schmitt), "that it is possible to confront irrefutably a radical materialist philosophy of history with a similarly radical spiritualist philosophy of history."<sup>10</sup> The mystical and esoteric nature of Dugin's Traditionalism is apparent throughout his writing and speaking, but nowhere more so than in his statement regarding the rationalism of Enlightenment Liberalism that, "Tradition is an antithesis to Cartesianism." "Formal logic," Dugin went on to say, was where antichrist "began the subversion" of the Traditional world.<sup>11</sup> Dugin's religious outlook involves a decidedly dualist view and he applies his own radical spiritualist philosophy not only to his view of history, but to his view of the future as well.

The Fourth Political Theory presupposes the disintegration of modern ideology and allows theology, all but excluded in Liberalism, to return and fill some of the vacuum. But according to Peter J. Leithart, "the theology that returns isn't necessary [sic] the theology of Christian orthodoxy"<sup>12</sup> In keeping with the multipolar world anticipated by the Fourth Political Theory, Dugin does not advocate a world where a single hegemon determines religious belief or practice. Advocating a multipolar world, at least until the Liberal West is rendered entirely obsolete, Fourth Political Theory vigorously opposes the hegemony of West. Dugin endorses theological Traditionalism and rejects the civil religion of Enlightened France after the Revolution and the civil religion of the West in its current postmodern manifestations.

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<sup>9</sup> "The Long Path," Open Revolt, accessed April 12, 2015, <http://openrevolt.info/2014/05/17/alexander-dugin-interview/>. Note: This interview with Dugin was posted on May 17, 2014 according to Open Revolt. This interview is posted in English. Open Revolt does not state if this interview was originally conducted in Russian or English, nor make any notes on translation or translator.

<sup>10</sup> Carl Schmitt, "Political Theology," *Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought*, ed. Thomas McCarthy, et al., trans. George Schwab (Cambridge and London, England: MIT Press, 1985), 42. Here Schmitt is using Weber to make his point that there is certainly a counterargument to the purely rational approach of Liberalism in issues of governance.

<sup>11</sup> "We Are Going to Cure You with Poison," ARCTOGAIA, accessed February 18, 2015, <http://arctogaia.com/public/eng/serpent.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Peter J. Leithart, "Fourth Political Theory," *First Things*, June 17, 2014, accessed February 14, 2015, <http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2014/06/fourth-political-theory>.

Dugin rejects Liberalism's secular theology as an extreme form of hubris. Dugin shares John Lukacs's rejection of Liberalism's conceit contained in Lukacs' claim that "[m]ost 'liberals' still cling to outdated dogmas of the so-called Enlightenment, unwilling to question the validity of 'Science.'"<sup>13</sup> More correctly, it is not science that Dugin despises, it is Scientism. The approach of Liberalism that "[d]emocracy is the expression of a political relativism and a scientific orientation that are liberated from miracles and dogmas and based on human understanding and critical doubt," is in direct agreement with a worldview that would "establish institutions and supranational laws of a federative structure."<sup>14</sup> The Fourth Political Theory rejects the former and vehemently opposes the latter.

Dugin presents a Traditionalist view in his critique of the Liberal Democratic West that can be seen to mirror Schmitt's belief that "[t]he idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world."<sup>15</sup> The Fourth Political Theory accepts the view that the "theology and metaphysics" of rational Liberalism "rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also the sovereign's direct intervention in a valid legal order."<sup>16</sup> Dugin applies a mystical and monarchist element in the Fourth Political Theory and favors sovereign intervention both metaphysically and politically.

The Fourth Political Theory includes goals expressed by Aleksandr Panarin concerning "a combination of the Eurasian religions."<sup>17</sup> This combination of religions would allow and encourage consensus between Orthodox, Muslim, and other religious cultures within the Eurasian sphere. Dugin and Panarin were more than contemporaries; Panarin had been a member of Dugin's Eurasian Party elite and had intended to collaborate in other ways with Dugin until death ended his cooperation and collaboration.<sup>18</sup> The inclusion and acceptance of the various religions present in the Eurasian geographical sphere is more than the incarnation of Western ecumenical ideas, it involves a more interwoven religion and state creation than is present in any Western Liberal Democratic government.

### ***The Fourth Political Theory as Heresy***

The recognition of Traditionalism by Rene Guénon and his adherents is a relatively recent occurrence. Although it purports to convey ancient Truth, the Traditionalist School is largely a product of the 20th century.<sup>19</sup> As Guénon gained followers, religious, spiritual, and academic writing concerning him and his beliefs increased. Guénon's Traditionalism is often identified as "Integral Traditionalism" and seems to have become the "Traditional Orthodox."<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> John Lukacs, *At the End of an Age*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 38.

<sup>14</sup> Carl Schmitt, "Political Theology", 42. See <http://www.recim.org/cdm/difin-an.htm> a website for "World Citizens" for examples of expressions of universally applied legal norms through a body of world governance.

<sup>15</sup> Carl Schmitt, "Political Theology," 36.

<sup>16</sup> Carl Schmitt, "Political Theology," 37.

<sup>17</sup> Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 98.

<sup>18</sup> Laruelle, "Russian Eurasianism," 89.

<sup>19</sup> The body of works, views, beliefs, and their interpretation and articulation by adherents or followers of Guénon and his teachings are largely twentieth century products; now there is a growing "second generation" of twenty first century writing on Guénon and his Traditionalist contemporaries.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Sedgwick provides counterpoints to Shekhovtsov and Umland posted September 26, 2009 in the blogspot, *Traditionalists*, that Sedgwick moderates. See: "Is Dugin a Traditionalist?", *Traditionalists*, accessed January 19, 2015, <http://traditionalistblog.blogspot.ie/2009/09/is-dugin-traditionalist.html>.

After Guénon and the other Traditionalist School “founders” created the Twentieth century body of work that their followers adhere to as Integral Traditionalism, opposing and contradictory (heretical) works and their advocates appeared as should be expected. To many of the Integral Traditionalists, Julius Evola and his disciple, Aleksandr Dugin, are the designated heretics; at least it seems so as Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland characterize Evola and Dugin. In their challenge to the legitimacy of Dugin’s Traditionalism based upon their interpretation of Integral Traditionalism’s Guénonian Orthodoxy Shekhovtsov and Umland claim that,

Dugin’s case raises a question also applicable to the assessment of Evola’s and the ENR’s interpretation of Integral Traditionalism: are Evola’s theories and the ENR’s ideology legitimate successors of Guénon’s teaching? The answer, we believe, is that they are not, or that they are at best skewed reinterpretations of Integral Traditionalism.<sup>21</sup>

The orthodoxy ascribed to Guénon’s articulation of Traditionalism is evident to Shekhovtsov and Umland as they proceed to offer specific examples of Evola’s and Dugin’s heretical deviations:

The universalist core of the deist worldview of classical Traditionalism...is lost in the outlooks of Evola, the ENR, and the disciples of “neo-Eurasianism.” Dugin plainly rejects the “transcendent unity of religions” — a central concept of Integral Traditionalism.<sup>22</sup>

Without arguing the merits of the opinion regarding whether “the deist worldview of classical Traditionalism” is an accurate depiction of Integral Traditionalism in this study, it does hold that, “[n]either Evola’s worldview nor the doctrines of the ENR and Dugin constitute the unequivocal rejection of Modernity that Integral Traditionalism explicitly demands.<sup>23</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland conclude that Dugin only partially rejects Modernism, accepting perhaps the technological aspects of progress in much the same way the USSR desired technology that rivaled the West without adopting the Liberalism that would usher in Liberal Democracy and cultural Westernization.<sup>24</sup> According to Shekhovtsov and Umland, the position taken by Roger Griffin is that Evola and Dugin are Fascists and this fact explains the radical rejection of the Liberal Democracy portions of Modernism without rejecting its technological elements.<sup>25</sup> Griffin argues that Evola and Dugin expound a fascism that “is not anti-modern,” but supports an “alternative modernity.”<sup>26</sup>

Shekhovtsov and Umland may have correctly identified heresy in the Traditionalism of Evola and Dugin; however, heresy versus orthodoxy in the academic or theological sense is not the overriding engagement concern if Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory becomes manifest in Russian geopolitical action. Shekhovtsov and Umland admit that, “At their core, many of Dugin’s works are an amalgamation of Traditionalist concepts, Evola’s theories, geopolitical ideas, and the ideology of the German interwar “Conservative Revolution.”<sup>27</sup> It is noteworthy that Dugin’s Traditionalism is admitted in part, but it is probably that the “amalgamation” that contributes a great deal to Shekhovtsov and Umland excluding Evola and Dugin from the strict confines of orthodoxy.

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<sup>21</sup> Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, “Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? “Neo-Eurasianism” and Perennial Philosophy,” *The Russian Review* 68 (October 2009): 666. Also see footnote 16; here the authors refer to Dugin’s *Filosofia traditsionalizma* (Moscow, 2002): 42–43, 100–101, as evidence from Dugin’s own work. ENR (European New Right (*Nouvelle Droite*) see [http://ihr.org/jhr/v14/v14n2p28\\_Warren.html](http://ihr.org/jhr/v14/v14n2p28_Warren.html) for an interview with key ENR proponent Alain de Benoist.

<sup>22</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 666. See footnote 59.

<sup>23</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 669.

<sup>24</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 669.

<sup>25</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 669. See footnote 37 referring to Roger Griffin, “The Sacred Synthesis: The Ideological Cohesion of Fascist Cultural Politics,” *Modern Italy* 31:1 (1998): 5–23.

<sup>26</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland, “Is Dugin a Traditionalist?,” 669.

<sup>27</sup> Shekhovtsov and Umland, Dugin a Traditionalist, 665.

### ***No Matter Integral or Heretical, It is Still a Form of Traditionalism***

Dugin has said that in his youth he “was deeply inspired by Traditionalism of Rene Guenon and Julius Evola.”<sup>28</sup> Dugin still claims his position is “on the side of sacred Tradition against the modern (and post-modern) world.”<sup>29</sup> Dugin openly connects his Traditionalist philosophy with Russian Orthodox practice, and he has, “laid the basis for Traditionalist thought trying to apply the ideas of Guenon and Evola to the Russian Orthodox Christian tradition,”<sup>30</sup>

Whether orthodox or heretical, if Dugin’s Traditionalism is a real influence in contemporary Russia it must be taken into consideration. On the cold stage of current geopolitical reality, whether hindsight places Dugin into history as an Integral Traditionalist, or a “Neo-Traditionalist,” or a Traditionalist by some other name, what matters is the weight and sticking power of Dugin’s Traditionalism and its place in the Fourth Political Theory. Examining both Integral Traditionalism and Dugin’s interpretative Traditionalism and its place in Fourth Political Theory allows for a more accurate analysis of Dugin’s reception. Clearer reception will allow Western policy decisions to be more effective as Russia develops its Eurasian persona.

### ***Eschatological Perspectives***

Eschatology figures prominently in Dugin’s theological projections of the Fourth Political Theory and its relationship to the Eurasianism he espouses. The fall of Communism was interpreted by Dugin as an eschatological event evident in his remark that, [t]he victory of liberalism over communism was the proof in my eyes of its eschatological nature.<sup>31</sup> The eschatological conflict is completely interwoven within the Fourth Political Theory and is evidence of the critical aspects of theology as Dugin’s foundational base for the superstructure of his theory.

“As follows from the very logic of apocalyptic drama,” Dugin states, “in the course of the last struggle, the clash will occur not between the Sacred and the profane, nor between Religion and atheism, but between Religion and pseudo-religion.”<sup>32</sup> From even a cursory examination of anti-Modernist literature it is evident that anti-Modern praxis *per se* does not require an apocalyptic framework. In contrast, Dugin’s Traditionalism begins with a religious foundation and ends in theological apocalypse; it is therefore more than just the rejection of the Modernity of Liberalism.

“The end times and the eschatological meaning of politics will not realize themselves on their own,” Dugin writes in *The Fourth Political Theory*.<sup>33</sup> Vehemently anti-Dugin critic James Heiser suggests that this statement, and other similar ones, illustrate Dugin’s belief that the apocalypse can be hastened; Heiser further contends that Dugin desires to accelerate the event.<sup>34</sup> “If the Fourth Political Practice is not able to

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<sup>28</sup> Dugin interview, “The Long Path.” The Spelling here is as in the original.

<sup>29</sup> Dugin interview, “The Long Path.”

<sup>30</sup> Dugin Interview, “The Long Path.”

<sup>31</sup> Dugin Interview, “The Long Path.”

<sup>32</sup> Dugin, “Ideology of the World Government,” ARCTOGAIA, assessed March 3, 2015, <http://arctogaia.com/public/eng-ed2.htm>.

<sup>33</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 183.

<sup>34</sup> Statements of Heiser’s opinions on Dugin’s apocalyptic intend can be found throughout Heiser’s book, *“The American Empire Should Be Destroyed”: Alexander Dugin and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology* (Malone, TX: Repristination Press 2014).

realise the end of times, then it would be invalid,” Dugin says.<sup>35</sup> The End of Days should come; but it will not come by itself,” He adds.<sup>36</sup>

Apocalyptic literature is often Manichean, and Dugin’s eschatology displays Manichean expressions. Mervyn F. Bendle, writing for *Quadrant*, characterizes Dugin’s eschatology by first comparing it to other apocalypticism then stating,

Dugin’s view is dualistic, depicting the world as a battleground within which the forces of good and evil, light and darkness, spirit and matter, contend for the fate of the planet. In Dugin’s version of apocalypticism, it is the “Atlanticist New World Order” based on liberalism, modernity, and materialism, that represents the forces of evil, while the peoples of Eurasia with their stronger spirituality constitute (or will soon constitute) the “New Eurasian Order” and form the vanguard for the forces for good.<sup>37</sup>

Dugin places Russia at the center of the New Eurasian Order; therefore Russia plays the lead role in the eschatology of the Fourth Political Theory. “The meaning of Russia is that through the Russian people will be realized the last thought of God, the thought of the End of the World,” Dugin is quoted as saying - and it is hard to get more politically eschatological than that.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Dugin’s Critique of Modernism and Liberalism***

Samuel Huntington may have disagreed with Dugin’s association of Modernism and Westernism in some specifics, but his general conclusion does mirror Dugin’s in that the “West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations.”<sup>39</sup> For Dugin, “Communism and Fascism have collapsed,” Leithart asserts, and Dugin then adopts the belief that “liberalism, the final twentieth-century ideology, turned into libertine postmodernism as soon as it triumphed.”<sup>40</sup> Dugin believes that “the idea of modernization is based on the idea of progress.”<sup>41</sup> And for Dugin, progress is a linear projection in Modernist thinking; and as it proceeds along its linear pathway that leads to the nihilism of Postmodernity. Dugin charges that Liberalism in the end contributes to decline and does not achieve the progress it claims.

Contemporary Russia, the Russia of Vladimir Putin, has voluntarily taken on the mantle of “traditional values.”<sup>42</sup> For many Putin supporters, traditional values coincide with Dugin’s rejection of Modernity and his view that the U.S. led West have rejected conservative and traditional norms of religion, family-centered morals and values, careful obedience to governmental and societal rules, along with gender expectations. Western reception of Dugin and the Fourth Political Theory must give considerable weight to his assertion that,

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<sup>35</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 183.

<sup>36</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 183.

<sup>37</sup> Mervyn F. Bendle, “Putin’s Rasputin,” *Quadrant Online*, September 3, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015, <https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2014/09/putins-rasputin/>.

<sup>38</sup> Stephen Shenfield, *Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001): 197. Shenfield credits an Alexandr Yanov critique of Dugin’s statement(s) in his notes.

<sup>39</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996): 20.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Leithart, “Fourth Political Theory”.

<sup>41</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 55.

<sup>42</sup> For an example of the application of this term see, James Kirchick, “Why Putin’s Defense of Traditional Values is Really a War on Freedom,” *Foreign Policy*, January 3, 2014, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/03/why-putins-defense-of-traditional-values-is-really-a-war-on-freedom/>.

I firmly stand for spiritual and religious values against actual decadent materialist and perverted culture. Traditionalism was and rests central as the philosophic focus of all my later developments.<sup>43</sup>

#### **Fourth Political Theory Attitudes Towards Women**

Concerns over the inclusion and treatment of women in Russian, Russia operating within a framework of Dugin's Fourth Political Theory, center on the application of Traditionalism into the political sphere. Notwithstanding the fact that Integral Traditionalism is opposed to any notion of Political Traditionalism, the Traditionalism of Fourth Political Theory demands it. Herein lies the rub for advocates of gender equality; Dugin's Traditionalism leans heavily toward male privilege. Two clear indications of this leaning may be found in Dugin's criticisms of Modernism and in his support for so-called "traditional" roles for females.

Relatively recent activities protesting, criticizing, and defying the traditional values claims of Dugin and others have attracted a great deal of attention both within Russian and on the international stage and brought the issues of gender equality into sharper focus. Performing their "Punk Prayer," Pussy Riot challenged Dugin's (hence Putin's) assumption of traditional values in a decidedly gender-focused display within Russian Orthodox sacred space.<sup>44</sup> Vera Shevzov correctly states that,

[a]lthough the live video footage of their activity in Christ the Saviour Cathedral testifies, the women were careful not to enter the actual sanctuary, their very proximity to it on the solea and the ambo in front of the royal doors in Moscow's Christ the Saviour Cathedral, where contemporary Orthodox Christians in Russia are conditioned to see only male clergy, heightened the perception of the eventual online virtual performance of Punk Prayer as a carefully planned 'invasion' or 'intrusion' of real space.<sup>45</sup>

Shevzov, examining Punk Prayer from a Russian Orthodox perspective, notes "the gender-charged staging and lyrics of Punk Prayer highlighted the otherness of the act on several levels."<sup>46</sup> Adopting Shevzov's multi-layered approach is effective in helping to clarify both the explosive impact of Punk Prayer and the deep Orthodox roots of patriarchal Russia. While recognizing the volatile nature the venue choice for performing Punk Prayer it is important to understand, as Shevzov points out, that correct perception of Pussy Riot's purposeful offense in the Russian mind is not exclusively gender based. However, while the women appropriated for their own artistic and political ends what is widely understood by Russian Orthodox believers as sacred space within an Orthodox church – a violation defined above all not by their identities as women but as perceived outsiders to the faith community – the fact remains that the sacred space they 'occupied' is associated primarily with male space in Orthodox Christian culture.<sup>47</sup>

It should be remembered that however amplified by the news and social media of the world, Pussy Riot was primarily playing on a Russian stage to a Russian audience. On the Russian stage, Pussy Riot declared,

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<sup>43</sup> Dugin interview, "The Long Path."

<sup>44</sup> Vera Shevzov, "Women on the Fault Lines of Faith: Pussy Riot and the Insider/Outsider Challenge to Post-Soviet Orthodoxy," *Religion and Gender* 4 no. 2 (2014): 123. See pages 121-144 for Shevzov's rather detailed examination of "Punk Prayer" as a religious act.

<sup>45</sup> Vera Shevzov, "Women on the Fault Lines," 123-124. Shevzov cites: "Pashinina, Antonida. 2012. 'Mrakobesy sushchestvuyut, v tom chisle i vo vlasti', Peoples. ru, 4 November, accessed 30 December 2012, [http://www.peoples.ru/state/statesmen/marat\\_gelman/interview2.html](http://www.peoples.ru/state/statesmen/marat_gelman/interview2.html)."

<sup>46</sup> Vera Shevzov, "Women on the Fault Lines," 123.

<sup>47</sup> Vera Shevzov, "Women on the Fault Lines," 123.

“we wanted to sing [our prayer] not on the street in front of the temple, but at the altar - that is, in a place where women are strictly forbidden.”<sup>48</sup> Shevzov reports Pussy Riot as arguing that “even the Mother of God would not be allowed in the altar were she to find herself in a church.”<sup>49</sup> “Punk Prayer infringed on the historically male-dominated sphere of church-state relations,” notes Shevzov.

As Dugin purposefully attempts to align Fourth Political Theory with the Russian Orthodox Church, Shevzov’s observation concerning the absence of women in the Church is notable.

[P]owerful women might be found in the annals of Russia’s political and cultural history, their numbers among the governing institutional echelons of the Russian Orthodox Church historically have been virtually non-existent. With its episcopal ranks filled with male monastics and with its ordination to the priesthood closed to women, the Russian Orthodox Church’s public theological and political voice in post-Soviet society remains overwhelmingly male, despite the fact that the public face of lived, devotional Orthodoxy is predominantly female.<sup>50</sup>

Dugin’s take on Punk Prayer is expressed in his comments in a 2012 video where he clearly places Pussy Riot in the category of blasphemers.<sup>51</sup> Dugin couches the argument in Manichean terms: placing Pussy Riot, at their supporters in opposition and contrast to the “Byzantine model of government - an alliance of the spiritual and temporal power” of contemporary Russia under Putin.<sup>52</sup>

Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev, Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, places Punk Prayer “in the tradition of the fierce anti-religious campaigns of the 1920s–1930s, which saw the mass destruction of churches and the brutal massacre of millions of faithful.”<sup>53</sup> “Kirill and other church officials cast the women as outsiders who were among those ‘dark forces’, which, within a faith-informed world view, have plagued Christianity throughout its two-thousand year history,” Shevzov proclaims.<sup>54</sup>

According to Minsk writer Anna Shadrina, “the patriarchal gender order remains an important element of nation building in modern Russia.”<sup>55</sup> She adds that the “image of Putin as a superman who is able to bring Russia back to its former glory is placed in direct opposition to the non-traditional values emanating from the West, which are depicted as alien and hostile to the Russian state and its identity.”<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Vera Shevzov, “Women on the Fault Lines,” 124. Shevzov cites: “Pussy Riot. 2013. *Pussy Riot! A Punk Prayer for Freedom*, NY: The Feminist Press.”

<sup>49</sup> Vera Shevzov, “Women on the Fault Lines,” 124.

<sup>50</sup> Vera Shevzov, “Women on the Fault Lines,” 124. Note also, “Vladimir Putin and Alexander Dugin’s vision of ‘Holy Russia’, which is shared with the Russian Orthodox Church, sees Russia’s mission as being to expand its influence and authority until it dominates the Eurasian landmass by means of a strong, centralized Russian state aligned with the Russian Orthodox Church, championing “traditional” social values over against the cultural corruption of a libertine West.” Paul Coyer, “Putin’s Holy War And The Disintegration Of The ‘Russian World,’” *Forbes*, June 5, 2015, <http://onforb.es/1eShWsd>.

<sup>51</sup> “Alexander Dugin: Pussy Riot’s Global Blackmail,” *Russia Insider*, August 15, 2012, accessed August 1, 2014, <http://russia-insider.com/en/2014/12/13/1813>. *Russia Insider* notes that this video originally appeared on Youtube at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxhxRyeX8tY>.

<sup>52</sup> Alexander Dugin: Pussy Riot’s Global Blackmail.

<sup>53</sup> Vera Shevzov, “Women on the Fault Lines,” 133.

<sup>54</sup> Vera Shevzov, “Women on the Fault Lines,” 133.

<sup>55</sup> Anna Shadrina “What is threatening ‘traditional family values’ in Russia today?” *Open Democracy*, May 5, 2015, accessed July 12, 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/anna-shadrina/what-is-threatening-%E2%80%98traditional-family-values%E2%80%99-in-russia-today>.

<sup>56</sup> Anna Shadrina, “Traditional Family Values.”

Dugin turns his head more to the East than to the West in his interpretation of traditional values. In a 2008 posting on the website of Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Robert Coalson wrote that “Dugin says the Russian cultural tradition on rights and values has more in common with the Islamic tradition than with Western liberalism.”<sup>57</sup> Coalson goes on quoting Dugin as saying, “In the Islamic and Orthodox traditions, almost everything corresponds.”<sup>58</sup> Comparisons of Fourth Political Theory with both Islamic and Orthodox traditions leave little room for any Western notions of gender equality. “We both reject specific aspects of secular, Western, European, individualistic conception of human rights,” is Dugin’s unapologetic position.<sup>59</sup>

### **Historical Placement of the Fourth Political Theory**

Francis Fukuyama, perhaps the most recognized advocate of the triumph of Liberalism, claims that not only is Liberalism the only actor left standing among the first three theories, it is the only actor - period. In Fukuyama’s interpretation, Liberalism’s victory signified the cessation of competition for the world’s political stage.<sup>60</sup>

Twenty-five years ago, just a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Francis Fukuyama published what became one of the most widely discussed and cited articles of the late 20th century. In “The End of History?” (the title lost its concluding question mark when it was published as a book in 1992), Fukuyama celebrated the global triumph of democracy and capitalism...<sup>61</sup>

Fukuyama’s opinion was succinctly expressed in his RAND paper in 1989 as it boldly proclaimed that,

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.<sup>62</sup>

### ***The Not so End of History***

The boldness of Fukuyama’s claim that the suspension of history occurred in 1989 is even more remarkable as it became evident that the mythical fisherman’s lament of “the big one that got away” was a more applicable expression than “the end of history” in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The possibility that Russia would follow the path of Western Liberal Democracy as the Soviet Union rapidly unraveled, can never really be known; it is now only a hypothetical question for “what if” pundits.

President George H. W. Bush, echoing a phrase employed by Woodrow Wilson, H.G. Wells, and others, noted many times beginning in 1990 that changes in Soviet policy signaled the emergence of a “New World

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<sup>57</sup> Robert Coalson, “Russian Conservatives Challenge Notion Of 'Universal' Values,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 10, 2008, accessed August 29, 2015, [http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian\\_Conservatives\\_Challenge\\_Notion\\_Of\\_Universal\\_Values/1358106.htm](http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Conservatives_Challenge_Notion_Of_Universal_Values/1358106.htm).

<sup>58</sup> Robert Coalson, “Russian Conservative Challenge Universal Values.”

<sup>59</sup> Robert Coalson, “Russian Conservatives Challenge Universal Values.”

<sup>60</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “Have we reached the end of history?,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7532>. The quoted report contains a footnote stating that it “is based on a lecture presented at the University of Chicago's John M. Olin Center.” See also, “The End of History?” <http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf>, accessed January 27, 2015; and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

<sup>61</sup> Alina Rocha Menocal, “History is So not Over,” Foreign Policy, September 17, 2014, accessed February 18, 2015, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/17/history\\_is\\_so\\_not\\_over](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/17/history_is_so_not_over).

<sup>62</sup> Fukuyama, “The End of History.”

Order.” Although he never really defined it exactly, Bush’s New World Order seemed to evoke an era when the major world powers work in concert for peaceful solutions to regional and global problems. Bush stated,

Time and again in this century, the political map of the world was transformed. And in each instance, a new world order came about through the advent of a new tyrant or the outbreak of a bloody global war, or its end. Now the world has undergone another upheaval, but this time, there’s no war.<sup>63</sup>

Ironically, less than a year later the President was also praising the attributes of Coalition Warfare in Iraq as an example of this New World Order.<sup>64</sup> As the 1990s progressed, the USSR collapsed, the turn of the century came and went, and with its passing the New World Order let the big one get away and Fukuyama’s End of History was placed on indefinite hold. Before the end of the End of History, Fukuyama had expressed his confidence of Soviet buy-in to an optimistic alignment with Western Liberal Democracy not as how, but as how much.

The real question for the future, however, is the degree to which Soviet elites have assimilated the consciousness of the universal homogenous state that is post Hitler Europe. From their writings and from my own personal contacts with them, there is no question in my mind that the liberal Soviet intelligentsia rallying around Gorbachev has arrived at the end-of-history view in a remarkably short time, due in no small measure to the contacts they have had since the Brezhnev era with the larger European civilization around them.<sup>65</sup>

As Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin was solidified after 1999, Fukuyama’s incredulity of ten years earlier with the prospect of Russia longing for a past prior to the Soviet era must seem truly ironic today. The automatic assumption that Russia shorn of its expansionist communist ideology should pick up where the czars left off just prior to the Bolshevik Revolution is therefore a curious one because,

It assumes that the evolution of human consciousness has stood still in the meantime, and that the Soviets, while picking up currently fashionable ideas in the realm of economics, will return to foreign policy views a century out of date in the rest of Europe.<sup>66</sup>

Fukuyama attempted to apply a linear progression of evolution using a Modernist concept of the political environment of the world while ignoring the reality that large segments of the world’s population harbor decidedly anti-Modern ideals and visualize the political environment using a much more circular conception. In the 1989 edition of “The End of History?” Fukuyama refers to Charles Krauthammer’s prescient 1988 remarks that “if as a result of Gorbachev’s reforms the USSR is shorn of Marxist-Leninist ideology, its behavior will revert to that of nineteenth century imperial Russia.”<sup>67</sup> Demonstrating that ideas may be out of date by looking ahead as well as by looking back, the Fourth Political Theory outlined by Dugin and Russian political policy under Putin seems to smack decidedly more of Czarism than Liberalism. Krauthammer’s speculation, rather than Fukuyama’s assertion, has proved the more accurate.

Dugin’s ideas gained traction within the Putin administration at a time of increasing Russian separation from the global aspirations of the New World Order.

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<sup>63</sup> George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in San Francisco, California,” The American Presidency Project, February 28, 1990, accessed February 11, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18201&st=new+world+order&st1=>.

<sup>64</sup> See for example Bush, “Remarks to Community Members at Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina,” The American Presidency Project, February 1, 1991, accessed February 11, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19267&st=new+world+order&st1=>.

<sup>65</sup> Fukuyama, “The End of History.”

<sup>66</sup> Fukuyama, “The End of History.”

<sup>67</sup> Fukuyama, “The End of History,” here referring to Charles Krauthammer, “Beyond the Cold War,” New Republic, December 19, 1988.

Meanwhile Putin came to power for third term and that was the moment of his decisive rupture with liberalism. Now Putin accepted Eurasianism and Radical Center orientation moving every day closer and closer to Fourth Political Theory. So this move is going on right now.<sup>68</sup>

“So right now,” Dugin said in his “Long Path” 2014 interview, “Putin’s political realism is joining my Fourth Political Theory and updated version Eurasianism.”<sup>69</sup>

Fukuyama posited that the End of History would be so absolute that it might even become boring, and he speculated, “Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.”<sup>70</sup> Boredom must have set in very quickly indeed. In what must now seem to Fukuyama to be an accelerated or arrested time/space continuum, either history does indeed seem to have started over again many fewer than the few centuries Fukuyama suggested, or in fact it never stopped at all.

### ***Unmodern Russia***

We live in the Modern Age, or so it would seem. But do we *all* live in the Modern Age? John Lukacs says no. Lukacs corrects the initial inaccuracy of assuming that the Modern Age is a universal global-temporal condition with his observation that it is not the “Modern Age,” it is the “*European Age*” [italics in original].<sup>71</sup> The European Age is a geographically dependent regional-temporal condition and Lukacs tells us that,

Until about five hundred years ago the main theater of history was the Mediterranean, and the principal actors were the people along or near its shores, with few important exceptions. With the discovery of the Americas, of the East Indies, of the shape of the globe itself, all this changed. The European age of world history began.<sup>72</sup>

Commenting on the Modern Age, Lukacs rather pointedly states, “the Ancient-Medieval-Modern chronological division is not applicable to countries and civilizations beyond the Western world.”<sup>73</sup> This inapplicability is important as it underscores the inaccuracy, if not complete fallacy, of overlaying one set of cultural norms and understandings universally or globally. Realizing that the Modern Age is a European concept and that, “the United States of America was a product of the Modern Age, born in the middle of it - indeed, at its high point - with its ideas and institutions having been largely (though not completely) the results of the eighteenth century Enlightenment,” we can better grasp the error Fukuyama committed with his claims of Liberalism’s global conquest.<sup>74</sup>

Assuming Russia within a European construct forces Russia to be received in the West as possessing a European mindset. This assumption is dangerous because, if it is not an accurate characterization of the reality of Russian geopolitical self-identification, predictions of Russian actions and reactions in its international relations, especially in its relations with the West, will be skewed to the point of uselessness - worst, to the point of catastrophe.

In November of 2000, shortly before undertaking a trip to Brunei, President Putin declared publicly: “Russia has always perceived of itself as a Eurasian country.” Dugin later termed this statement “an epochal, grandiose revolutionary admission, which, in general, changes

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<sup>68</sup> Dugin interview, “The Long Path.”

<sup>69</sup> Dugin interview, “The Long Path.”

<sup>70</sup> Fukuyama, “The End of History.”

<sup>71</sup> Lukacs, “At the End of an Age,” 10.

<sup>72</sup> Lukacs, “At the End of an Age,” 10.

<sup>73</sup> Lukacs, “At the End of an Age,” 5.

<sup>74</sup> Lukacs, “At the End of an Age,” 12.

everything. The prophecy of [French conspiratologist] Jean Parvulesco has come to pass... There will be a Eurasian millennium.”<sup>75</sup>

Putin does not place Russia’s future in a European context. Western reception will continue to be confused and out-of-focus if it interprets Russian intentions and actions as the intentions and actions of a Western Liberal actor. Fukuyama erred when he attempted to compare the liberal American Modern Age apple with the Russian tradition-embracing orange.

Fukuyama did glimpse the coming reality of Russia’s forging ahead through history instead of waiting to become bored with the lack of it; but glimpse it was all he did. However, in his brief glimpse Fukuyama may have hit closer to center mass than he realized at the time. Engaged in second thought, he allowed, “[u]nlike the propagators of traditional Marxism-Leninism, however, ultranationalists in the USSR believe in their Slavophile cause passionately, and one gets the sense that the fascist alternative is not one that has played itself out entirely there.”<sup>76</sup> Dugin’s current claims of not being a proponent of Fascist doctrine notwithstanding, Fukuyama was correct that there is a Russian alternative that has not entirely played itself out. The bottom line is that Dugin and his colleagues of the RNR simply do not buy Liberalism’s claims, especially those claims placing Liberalism at the end of history. What Dugin does see is the historical validity in the rise and fall of two out of three political theories of Modernity and the totally misguided ideology developed by the survivor. According to Dugin,

[l]iberalism itself has changed, passing from the level of ideas, political programs, and declarations to the level of reality, penetrating the very flesh of the social fabric, which became infused with liberalism and, in turn, it began to seem like the natural order of things. This was presented not as a political process, but as a natural and organic one.<sup>77</sup>

#### ***Fourth Political Theory Traditionalism as a Rejection of The New World Order***

Dugin’s belief that the New World Order viewed “genuine global cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union...not only possible, but very probable” seems to conform to a rather tame interpretation of Bush’s understanding of just what the New World Order was all about.<sup>78</sup> In this light the New World Order is “presumably a product of convergence theory, predicting the synthesis of the Soviet socialist and Western capitalist political forms and close cooperation of the Soviet Union and USA” in dealing with issues of a regional nature.<sup>79</sup> However, in reality Dugin and his Fourth Political Theory colleagues read much more threatening political overtones into New World Order yearnings than in relatively tame goals of cooperation and Soviet synthesis resulting in a more Western style democracy.

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<sup>75</sup> John Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,” *The Fourth Political Theory*, accessed January 17 2015, <http://www.4pt.su/en/content/aleksandr-dugin%E2%80%99s-foundations-geopolitics>. See footnote 30: Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya vseгда oshchushchala sebya evroaziatskoi stranoi,” *Strana.ru* (November 13, 2000) and footnote 31. See also: *Restructuring Post-Communist Russia*, Yitzhak Brudny, Jonathan Frankel, and Stefani Hoffman, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 174.

<sup>76</sup> Fukuyama, “The End of History.”

<sup>77</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 11.

<sup>78</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 71.

<sup>79</sup> Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory,” 71.

In the early 1990s, as President Bush began proclaiming the arrival of a New World Order, Dugin began to proclaim its inherent evil. "After the Gulf War," Dugin wrote, "almost all mass media outlets in Russia, as well as in the West, injected into the common speak the formula "New World Order," coined by George Bush, and then used by other politicians including Gorbachev and Yeltsin."<sup>80</sup> The seriousness of the theological implications Dugin and his colleagues producing the journalistic magazine, *Elements* (*Elementy*), placed on Bush's repeated use of New World Order phraseology took on a conspiracy-like tone in statements such as:

The New World Order, based on the establishment of a One World Government, as has been candidly admitted by ideologists [sic] of the Trilateral Commission and Bildenbug, is not simply a question of politico-economic domination of a certain "occult" ruling clique of international bankers. This "Order" bases itself on the victory on a global scale of a certain special ideology, and so the concept concerns not only instruments of power, but also "ideological revolution," a "coup d'état" consciousness, "new thinking."<sup>81</sup>

## Conclusion

The validity of Dugin's analysis and conclusion and is not the critical issue - the implication of it is. The Fourth Political Theory is Dugin's amalgamation of Traditionalism, political theology, and Eurasianism. It is decidedly religious, patriarchal, and historically cognizant. Western reception of the Fourth Political Theory lacking appreciation of its theological foundations is myopic, naive, and potentially perilous. Western concepts of human rights fail to capture Dugin's Eurasian conceptions because it confuses the Western concept of elevation of the individual over the concept of elevation of the collective. Gender equality, the Western emphasis upon redressing the injustice of failing to fully recognize the female as individual, falls upon the deaf ears of the patriarchal traditions embedded in the Fourth Political Theory. Patriarchal heritage favors the monarchical aspects of the Fourth Political Theory. Dugin celebrates placing his Eurasian geopolitical ideology within a construct of idealized Russian history. Modernism and Western Liberal Democracy is rejected in favor of a Statism that powerfully centralized and conservative.

It is a mistake to place Dugin and the Fourth Political Theory on the fringes of current geopolitical conceptions; it is a mistake with potentially violent consequences. Such a mistaken reception denies that Russia under Putin is striving for historically Russian aspirations - Eurasian power, warm water ports supporting its land-centered self-concept in opposition to the great Western maritime power of Dugin's Atlantis, and the inextricable braiding of a monarchical religious and political state. It is a mistake to think that Dugin favors a Russian that yearns for the restoration of the Soviet Union; Dugin is proving to be much more Czarist than Soviet revivalist.

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<sup>80</sup> Dugin, "Ideology of the New World Government."

<sup>81</sup> Dugin, "Ideology of the New World Government."

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